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ISO 26262, a functional-safety standard, uses Automotive Safety Integrity 
Levels (ASILs) to assign safety requirements to automotive-system 
elements. System designers initially assign ASILs to system-level hazards 
and then allocate them to elements of the refined system architecture. 
Through ASIL decomposition, designers can divide a function’s safety 
requirements among multiple components. However, in practice, manual 
ASIL decomposition is difficult and produces varying results. To overcome 
this problem, a new tool automates ASIL allocation and decomposition. It 
supports the system and software engineering life cycle by enabling users 
to efficiently allocate safety requirements regarding systematic failures in 
the design of critical embedded computer systems. The tool is applicable 
to industries with a similar concept of safety integrity levels. 
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A new tool automates Automotive Safety Integrity Levels’ allocation and 
decomposition. It supports the system and software engineering life cycle 
by letting users allocate safety requirements regarding systematic failures 
in the design of critical embedded computer systems. The tool is 
applicable to industries with a similar concept of safety integrity levels. 
ISO 26262 is a functional-safety standard that defines a detailed safety life cycle for developing electrical 
and electronic systems for passenger cars. The automotive industry has already been using safety analysis 
and validation and verification techniques to ensure vehicle safety. However, ISO 26262 means that these 
techniques must now be applied as part of a standardized, industry-wide methodology. One major focus of 
the standard is traceability: the ability to consistently track how safety requirements are being refined and 
met from the initial concept development to the final production and operation. 
Traditionally, safety requirements have been expressed quantitatively, using maximum target 
probabilities for system failures that shouldn’t be exceeded. However, techniques for quantifying the 
probability of software failure are immature. Instead, we can use Automotive Safety Integrity Levels 
(ASILs) to represent safety requirements’ stringency regarding software and systematic failures in general. 
ASILs are an adaptation, for the passenger car industry, of the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) defined in IEC 
61508. They range from A (least strict) to D (strictest), with QM representing no special safety 
requirements (normal quality management controls are applied). 
 
We’ve developed a tool that supports ISO 26262 by employing ASILs to help its users manage top-
down allocation and verification of safety requirements regarding systematic failure—including software 
failure—during the design of complex systems. It will also likely support any similar future standards 
derived from ISO 26262 in other application domains and thus generally support the design of safety-
critical systems in their systems-engineering life cycle. 
Automotive Safety Integrity Levels 
Designers initially encounter ASILs during concept development. Once they’ve identified the system’s 
major functions (propulsion, braking, and so on), ISO 26262 requires a hazard analysis. The designers must 
examine the different functions to determine how they could malfunction in various scenarios (for example, 
bad weather or busy roads) and what hazards could arise as a result. On the basis of each hazard’s severity, 
controllability, and exposure, i.e., the probability that the environmental factors of the hazard are 
present, , they assign an ASIL to the hazard. Finally, they define safety goals for each hazard, which serve 
as the system’s high-level safety requirements. During the architecture development, they must show how 
the design fulfills and refines the original safety requirements. (For example, an analysis could show that 
any components that could contribute to a given hazard can meet the requirements defined by the hazard’s 
ASIL1). 
ISO 26262 introduces ASIL decomposition, which allows a safety-critical system to meet a particular 
ASIL target without all its components having to meet that target. If a particular hazard can be caused only 
by two independent, heterogeneous components failing, the two components can share the responsibility 
for meeting that hazard’s ASIL, rather than each having to meet the full ASIL. 
To allow this decomposition, ISO 26262 defines a simple integer algebra. Each ASIL is equivalent to a 
number: QM = 0, A = 1, B = 2, C = 3, and D = 4. So, two components that share responsibility for meeting 
ASIL D might individually only be required to meet ASIL B because it produces the same ASIL value: 2 + 
2 = 4. This is important because higher ASILs inevitably mean higher costs. To meet more stringent safety 
requirements, more safety measures must be in place, more work must be performed, and higher-quality 
components will likely be needed. Therefore, a component’s ASIL could significantly affect both 
development and production costs. So, being able to efficiently allocate ASILs is important so that we can 
meet the safety requirements without being unnecessarily stringent or expensive. 
To manage the complexity of storing all the information the standard requires, automotive companies 
increasingly use model-based design techniques, particularly integrated modeling platforms and 
architectural description languages (ADLs) such as the automotive-focused EAST-ADL.2 These 
approaches help consolidate much of the information in a single model (often containing multiple layers). 
They also serve as useful platforms for the analyses that ISO 26262 requires such as failure modes and 
effects analysis (FMEA).3 However, many aspects of the ISO 26262 process can be difficult or laborious to 
perform manually. ASIL decomposition requires detailed knowledge of how the system elements are 
interrelated and how failures can propagate between them, and can generate many possible ASIL 
allocations for the system.4 Some level of automation would therefore greatly benefit developers. 
Our technique lets us automate both decomposition and allocation of ASILs.5 This lets system designers 
rapidly understand how the system’s parts relate to top-level ASIL requirements and helps them evaluate 
possible ASIL distributions across system components. Furthermore, because our tool is hierarchical, we 
can apply it recursively to a supply chain, helping to support the layered process of system development. 
For example, designers might determine an initial allocation of ASILs to system elements at the functional 
level and then provide these as goals or constraints to component suppliers during hardware development. 
Those suppliers can apply the same techniques to decompose the component-level ASILs across the 
different elements of the component subarchitecture. This ensures that the final product still meets the 
overall ASIL requirements that the system design set. 
Allocating and Decomposing Safety Requirements 
We developed automatic ASIL decomposition and allocation as an extension to HiP-HOPS (hierarchically 
performed hazard origin and propagation studies), an advanced safety analysis and design optimization tool 
used at several large automotive companies.6,7 HiP-HOPS belongs to the state-of-the-art of semiformal and 
formal analysis techniques that partly automate safety analysis.7 It employs an architectural system model 
that has been annotated with component failure logic. This logic describes how  combinations of internal 
failure modes and failures received at a component’s inputs can cause failures at the component’s outputs. 
The architectural model contains information about the system’s topology and how the components are 
connected. 
From this annotated model, HiP-HOPS can combine component failure descriptions to automatically 
synthesize fault trees. These trees describe how each system hazard can be caused by the propagation and 
combination of failures through the system architecture. The tool analyzes these trees to find their minimal 
cut sets, which are the smallest combinations of failures necessary to cause a particular hazard. 
HiP-HOPS’s system error model takes the form of a system topology and logical networks describing 
the propagation of failures through that topology. It can serve other purposes than fault tree analysis and 
FMEA. Users can also employ this knowledge to automatically decompose ASILs that are initially 
assigned to hazards across the system architecture. So, they can assign lower ASILs (or even QM) to 
components that don’t contribute to failure or contribute only indirectly in conjunction with other 
components. The users then allocate the original ASILs to only those components that directly cause 
system hazards. This produces a more economical allocation of ASILs across the system architecture. 
We can determine how and where this decomposition occurs on the basis of the logic of the minimal cut 
sets. Cut sets are presented as the sum of products. So, for example, if hazard H1 is caused by a failure of 
component X (FX) or failures of components Y and Z combined (FY, FZ), the cut sets are 
• FX, and 
• FY AND  FZ.  
FX is a single-point failure; it causes the hazard by itself. In contrast, (FY AND FZ) is a dual-point failure; 
two failures must occur in conjunction to cause the hazard. 
Each cut set inherits the ASIL of the hazard it causes. If a cut set is a single-point failure, that failure 
will inherit the corresponding ASIL. If the cut set is a multiple-point failure, the failures can share the ASIL 
according to the ASIL algebra. So, if H1 has ASIL D, we have these options: 
• FY = QM, FZ = ASIL D; 
• FY = ASIL A, FZ = ASIL C; 
• FY = ASIL B, FZ = ASIL B; 
• FY = ASIL C, FZ = ASIL A; and 
• FY = ASIL D, FZ = QM. 
FX always has ASIL D because it’s a single-point failure. FY and FZ could have higher ASILs (for 
example, both could have ASIL D), but that would be an unnecessarily expensive way to meet the safety 
requirements. Our tool assigns the ASILs directly to components’ internal failures. When a component 
contains multiple failures, users can further refine requirements. However, if a component allocation is 
required, they can apply a heuristic a posteriori (for example, by selecting the highest ASIL of a 
component’s failures). 
If multiple hazards exist, a given component failure could contribute to more than one hazard. In that 
case, the failure becomes subject to multiple, potentially conflicting constraints. For example, if in addition 
to H1 we have H2, which has ASIL B and whose only cause is FZ, we know that FZ can never have less 
than ASIL B. Otherwise, it wouldn’t meet H2’s safety requirement. That decreases the possible allocations 
for H1 as well. 
Our tool handles all of these conflicting calculations automatically. HiP-HOPS performs multiple fault 
tree analyses together (one for each system hazard) and shares branches and failures wherever possible. So, 
according to its knowledge base, it’s aware when a particular failure might contribute to multiple hazards. 
Once the decomposition is complete, the tool  lists possible ASIL allocations for all the relevant system 
failures. Users can then employ different heuristics to evaluate and sort the results, letting them concentrate 
on the most promising allocations and removing unnecessarily expensive ones. 
A Hybrid-Braking-System Example 
To better demonstrate our tool, we applied it to a hybrid brake-by-wire system.8 This system, which 
Ricardo de Castro and his colleagues introduced,9 is for electric vehicles propelled by four in-wheel motors 
(IWMs). “Hybrid” means that braking occurs through the combined action of electric braking (provided by 
the IWMs) and friction brakes (electromechanical actuators).10 During braking, the IWMs transform the 
vehicle’s kinetic energy into electricity, which charges the power train battery, increasing the vehicle’s 
range. 
Brake-by-wire eliminates the hydraulic connection between the brake pedal and individual wheel 
brakes. Instead, an electronic bus system handles communication between a central processing unit, which 
senses brake pedal movement and transforms it into braking force for each wheel, and local processing 
units, which each subsequently control a pair of braking actuators (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. A hybrid brake-by-wire system. Braking occurs through the combined action of electric braking 
(provided by the in-wheel motors—IWMs) and friction brakes (electromechanical actuators). 
For this simplified case study, we modeled the system to consider the braking function of only one 
wheel. Because braking forces can be controlled individually for each wheel, this simplification doesn’t 
affect the failure analysis. The system operates as follows. As the driver presses the brake pedal, an 
electronic pedal unit senses and processes the driver’s actions. Braking demands are then sent via a duplex 
bus system to a wheel node controller (WNC). After processing the demands, the WNC generates 
commands to the power converters to activate the electromechanical brake (EMB) and IWM. 
The system uses two batteries: an auxiliary battery feeds the car’s low-voltage loads, and a power train 
battery handles the high-voltage power transfers with the IWMs. During braking, power flows from the 
auxiliary battery to the EMB and from the IWM to the power train battery. 
We considered two hazards: 
• no braking after request from the driver (H1) 
• braking more/less than required by the driver (H2). 
We could have also examined other hazards, such as unintended braking, but for illustrative purposes, we 
focused on these two. 
Furthermore, each hazard receives an ASIL based on its severity; for illustration, we assigned ASIL D to 
H1 and ASIL A to H2. (Normally, ISO 26262 risk assessment would determine the appropriate ASILs.) H1 
occurs when braking is omitted from both the IWM and the EMB. H2 occurs when either braking device 
brakes with an incorrect value. This results in two failure expressions: 
Omission of Braking = Omission of EMB.out1 AND Omission of IWM.out1, 
Value Deviation of Braking = Value Deviation of EMB.out1 OR Value Deviation of IWM.out1. 
Analysis Results 
After fault tree analysis, HiP-HOPS found these results: 
• H1 had 19 minimal cut sets—1 single-point failure and 18 dual-point failures. 
• H2 had 11 minimal cut sets—10 single-point failures and 1 dual-point failure. 
Using these cut sets, HiP-HOPS computed 125 possible ASIL solutions. Manually evaluating every 
solution would be difficult, and this is only a simplified test model—larger models could produce 
thousands of possible solutions. HiP-HOPS lets designers use different cost-based heuristics to 
automatically evaluate and rank solutions (and filter out redundant ones), letting them focus on the most 
promising options. There has been some discussion in the functional-safety community concerning the 
definition of the most realistic ASIL-dependent cost function, and people have proposed many theories. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the biggest cost jump is from ASIL B to C. Here, we used this heuristic: 
• QM = 0 cost, 
• A = 10 cost, 
• B = 20 cost, 
• C = 40 cost, and 
• D = 50 cost. 
This heuristic isn’t ideal for real-world situations because two components with the same ASIL 
requirements will likely have different costs. However, it could serve as a useful guideline, and more 
accurate heuristics could be developed for each system being analyzed (for example, based on average 
ASIL costs across the system). Our algorithm is generic in that its parameters can easily be changed to 
achieve adaptability across industries and isn’t tied to a particular heuristic. 
To demonstrate further how HiP-HOPS determines possible ASIL solutions, consider the electronic 
pedal’s internal failures. The pedal generates two independent outputs, both of which can deviate from their 
normal behavior by value (value failures VF1 and VF2) and omission (omission failures OF1 and OF2). 
This gives these failure expressions: 
• OF1 and OF2 occurring simultaneously causes H1. 
• VF1 independently causes H2. 
• OF1 and VF2 occurring simultaneously causes H2. 
In accordance with ASIL algebra, this produces these inequalities: 
• ASIL of OF1 + ASIL of OF2 ≥ ASIL of H1 (D). 
• ASIL of VF1 ≥ ASIL of H2 (A). 
• ASIL of OF1 + ASIL of VF2 ≥ ASIL of H2 (A). 
According to the second inequality, we can infer that ASIL A is the most economical allocation for VF1. 
Regarding the first inequality, we can derive the set of solutions: 
• OF1 = 0, OF2= 4; 
• OF1 = 1, OF2 = 3; 
• OF1 = 1, OF2 = 4 (dominated); 
• OF1 = 2, OF2 = 2; 
• OF1 = 2, OF2 = 3 (dominated); 
• OF1 = 2, OF2 = 4 (dominated); 
• OF1 = 3, OF2 = 1; 
• OF1 = 3, OF2 = 2 (dominated); 
• OF1 = 3, OF2 = 3 (dominated); 
• OF1 = 3, OF2 = 4 (dominated); 
• OF1 = 4, OF2 = 0; 
• OF1 = 4, OF2 = 1 (dominated); 
• OF1 = 4, OF2 = 2 (dominated); 
• OF1 = 4, OF2 = 3 (dominated); and 
• OF1 = 4, OF2 = 4 (dominated). 
A dominated solution contains an ASIL that’s at least one higher than another solution but contains no 
lower ASILs. For example, (OF1 = 1, OF2 = 4) is dominated by (OF1 = 1, OF2 = 3). We filter out 
dominated solutions because they offer no benefits: other solutions are cheaper and just as capable of 
fulfilling the top-level safety requirements. Furthermore, as the third inequality shows, OF1 is involved in 
another cut set; its ASIL and the ones allocated to OF2 and VF2 must take into account the constraints of 
the first and third inequalities. We consider only ASIL QM and ASIL A for VF2 because it’s not involved 
in another cut set and higher ASILs would always produce dominated solutions. 
Table 1 shows the nondominated ASIL allocations for the four failures. 
 
Table 1. The nondominated Automotive Safety Integrity Level allocations for four failures.* 
OF1 OF2 VF1 VF2 Total cost 
0 4 1 1 70 
1 3 1 0 60 
2 2 1 0 50 
3 1 1 0 60 
4 0 1 0 60 
* Bold indicates the cheapest solution according to the cost heuristic. 
Discussion 
We evaluated the previous results only by a cost heuristic. You could choose another set of ASILs based on 
components’ real cost information, if available, or as a result of a designer’s system expertise. The possible 
ASIL allocations that our tool produces are intended only to inform decision making. When allocating 
ASILs, designers still must take into account other considerations such as the use of legacy components 
(which are typically treated as QM), the difficulty of proving components’ independence, and hardware 
metrics’ impact. Designers are free to draw conclusions from the information provided by the list of 
possible ASIL allocations and evolve the architecture accordingly, which could result in a new hazard 
analysis and thus potentially new ASIL constraints. As such, you can view ASIL decomposition as part of 
an overall iterative design process, and our proposed tool facilitates this. 
Selecting the final ASIL allocation requires an informed decision by the designers, taking into account 
all the factors. This decision might also involve the supplier. In our case study, the cheapest solution 
assigned ASIL B to H1 and ASIL A to H2. In this case, the supplier could indicate that it has a component 
that complies with ASIL B for both kinds of failures; using that component would be faster and likely 
cheaper than developing a new one. This would require revising all the cut sets involving the EMB value 
failure. However, such design and analysis iteration is much faster with an automated tool such as HiP-
HOPS. 
ISO 26262 is still relatively new; practitioners still need time to fully understand its principles and develop 
compatible methodologies. For now, ASIL decomposition is often interpreted and applied in different 
ways.11 Our tool isn’t intended to prescribe a particular method or interpretation but to help automate 
decomposition to support whichever method designers are using. 
For our tool’s application in other domains, the key element to address is a thorough examination of 
how other standards define SILs. For example, in aerospace, SILs are called DALs (development assurance 
levels), and they follow slightly different rules than ISO 26262 ASILs. However, once these rules have 
been identified, our general method can be adapted for other domains, and the relevant constraints can be 
imposed on possible decompositions according to each standard. 
A second issue is scale and complexity. Our tool is inherently hierarchical, which enables its application 
as part of a supply chain. So, designers can determine an allocation of ASILs for an overall system and pass 
on those ASIL requirements to component suppliers. The suppliers can then employ the same techniques 
independently in smaller parts of the design. 
Although this helps manage complexity, many combinations of component integrity levels achieve the 
same result, and the number of combinations grows as these options multiply during refinement. Evaluating 
every feasible decomposition of ASILs is possible for smaller systems but impractical for large-scale 
architectures. To solve this, we’re working with genetic algorithms and other metaheuristic optimization 
techniques because they don’t need to search an entire design space. We hope that through them, our tool 
will achieve similar results much more quickly and efficiently. 
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